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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 15-2253 
__________ 
 
LEWIS HUGHES, 
                             Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court Civil No. 2-14-cv-00027) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gustave Diamond 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 November 20, 2015 
 
BEFORE:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed: January 20, 2016) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Lewis Hughes appeals from the District Court’s order affirming the Commissioner 
of Social Security’s decision to deny him disability benefits under the Social Security 
Act.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Inasmuch as this opinion lacks any precedential value, we write solely to explain 
our reasoning to the parties.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are 
necessary to explicate our decision. 
 Hughes protectively filed for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and 
Supplemental Security Income in May of 2008, alleging he became disabled due to health 
conditions that began in March of 2007.  His applications were denied and Hughes then 
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.  He received such a hearing 
and, in January of 2010, the ALJ found Hughes not to be disabled.  The Appeals Council 
denied Hughes’ request for review.  Hughes then sought judicial review in the District 
Court, which remanded the matter for further development of the record.   
 On remand, a different ALJ held another hearing at which Hughes testified and 
was represented by counsel.  In January 2013, the ALJ again found Hughes not to be 
disabled.  The ALJ filed a thorough written decision in which he determined that Hughes’ 
residual functional capacity (RFC) did not prevent him from performing work existing in 
significant numbers in the national economy.  The Appeals Council again denied 
Hughes’ request for review, thereby rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the 
Commissioner.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.  Hughes sought judicial review in the District 
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Court, which affirmed, finding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings and 
conclusions.  Hughes then filed this appeal.1 
II. 
A. 
 Hughes raises three issues on appeal.  He first argues that, on remand, the ALJ 
erred by not following the instructions of the District Court and Appeals Council.  
Hughes’ argument is as conclusory as it is unconvincing.  Hughes’ brief does not identify 
what instructions the ALJ failed to follow on remand, nor does he point to any specific 
errors of law or fact arising from any omission.  Citing our decision in Thomas v. 
Commissioner, 625 F.3d 798, 800-01 (3d Cir. 2010), the District Court instructed that, 
“[o]n remand, the ALJ shall fully develop the record [for the entire period of disability 
under consideration] and explain [his or her] findings . . . to ensure that the parties have 
an opportunity to be heard on the remanded issues and prevent post hoc rationalization.”  
That was certainly accomplished here.  Upon remand, a different ALJ held two hearings 
and issued a thorough decision.  Hughes again appealed this decision to the Appeals 
Council, which noted and rejected his argument that the ALJ did not consider on remand 
his Global Assessment of Functioning scores, or his suicide attempts, among other things.  
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  While our review of the Commissioner’s legal 
determinations is plenary, we review her factual findings for “substantial evidence.”  42 
U.S.C. § 405(g); Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Thus, we must uphold any fact found by the Commissioner as conclusive if supported by 
substantial evidence, that is, “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 
2003) (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
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Hughes has not offered any specifics as to how the ALJ failed to follow the instructions 
of the District Court and Appellate Council on remand and we reject this conclusory 
argument. 
 Next, and with more specificity, Hughes maintains that the ALJ did not properly 
evaluate other various reports in the record.  This is simply not the case.  For example, 
Hughes’ claim that the ALJ failed to consider a 2008 intake assessment from Chestnut 
Ridge Counseling Services is disproved by the record.  The ALJ’s decision specifically 
notes the Chestnut Ridge report, citing to it as “Exhibit 12F.”  App. at 70.  Hughes also 
argues that the ALJ failed to consider the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Marjorie 
Tavoularis.  However, the ALJ’s decision indicates its review of Dr. Tavoularis’ report.  
Not only did the ALJ, on remand, incorporate by reference the previous ALJ’s discussion 
of Dr. Tavoularis’ evaluation, but the second ALJ referenced the assessment directly.  
App. at 76 (citing to Exhibit 6F).  Likewise, Hughes’ claim that the succeeding ALJ did 
not consider the reports of Dr. Prabir Mullick is baseless because the ALJ distinctly 
referred to these treatment reports in his decision.  App. at 64.  The same goes for 
Hughes’ claim that the ALJ failed to take into consideration Dr. Edyie Moses-Kolko’s 
treatment notes.  The ALJ’s decision includes a detailed discussion of these notes, with 
citations to the corresponding exhibits in the record.  App. at 65-67 (citing Exhibit 19F).   
 Hughes makes reference to the GAF scores he received from different 
professionals at various times during treatment, implying there is an appealable issue 
here.  Yet, he makes no direct argument that the ALJ failed to take these scores into 
consideration.  And, if he had, such an argument would be meritless for two reasons.  
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First, the ALJ did, in fact, consider Hughes’ GAF scores, noting, for example, that “[h]e 
had a GAF rating of 49 as of October 2009, which increased to 55 as of . . . December 
2009 . . ..”  App. at 64.  Second, the ALJ’s review of the medical evidence on remand 
incorporated by reference the decision of the prior ALJ, which likewise discussed 
Hughes’ GAF scores.2   
B. 
 Hughes also argues that the ALJ failed to note adequate reasons for discounting 
the opinion of Lindsey Groves; an opinion that, had it been adopted, would have found 
Hughes to be disabled.  We disagree: the ALJ provided valid reasons for discounting 
Groves’ opinion.  As the District Court correctly noted, Groves was not a treating 
medical source.  Therefore, her opinion was not entitled to the controlling weight that is 
typically given to a treating source’s opinion.  Based on a single examination, Groves 
submitted a fill-in-the-blank form that was unaccompanied by any annotations, notes, or 
explanations, and that relied on Hughes’ own reports of symptoms and treatment as 
opposed to the entire treatment record.  Also, the ALJ appropriately discounted Groves’ 
diagnosis of cognitive disorder because that diagnosis was also unsupported by the 
treatment record.  As set out in the ALJ’s opinion, neither of Hughes’ treating mental 
health professionals diagnosed Hughes with a cognitive disorder caused by a coma.  App. 
                                              
2 We note that the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, DSM–5, abandoned the GAF scale as a measurement tool.  Because of this, 
the Social Security Administration now permits ALJs to use GAF ratings as opinion 
evidence when assessing disability claims involving mental disorders; but instructed that 
a “GAF score is never dispositive of impairment severity,” and an ALJ should not “give 
controlling weight to a GAF from a treating source unless it is well supported and not 
inconsistent with other evidence.”  SSA AM–13066 at 5 (July 13, 2013). 
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at 71.  We note that while Groves diagnosed Hughes as agoraphobic, the record evidence 
established that Hughes could function outside the home, even though he had anxiety in 
social situations.  App. at 71.  Given all of the above, the ALJ did not err by concluding 
that Groves’ opinion was not fully supported by the weight of substantial evidence and as 
such is not entitled to controlling weight on the issue of disability.3 
C. 
 Lastly, Hughes argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational 
expert was flawed because it did not sufficiently include all of his limitations.  We reject 
this argument as well.  We have instructed that an “ALJ must accurately convey to the 
vocational expert all of a claimant’s credibly established limitations.”  Rutherford v. 
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original).  An ALJ does not 
have “to submit to the vocational expert every impairment alleged by a claimant,” 
however.  Id. (emphasis in original).  That is, an ALJ’s hypothetical must convey only 
those limitations that have been credibly established to the vocational expert.  Id.  Here, 
the ALJ determined that Hughes has some credible limitations—chronic back pain, 
bipolar disorder, panic disorder, and borderline personality disorder—and framed his 
hypothetical question accordingly.  The ALJ asked if jobs were available for an 
individual limited to “light work” in a “low stress, stabile [sic] work environment” 
                                              
3 To the extent that Hughes believes the District Court ordered the ALJ to accept Groves’ 
opinion on remand, he is mistaken.  The District Court remanded because it found the 
first ALJ’s decision lacked sufficient support and relied on improper reasons in rejecting  
Groves’ report.  But, it did not order that a subsequent ALJ accept Groves’ conclusions.  
As we have noted, the ALJ’s decision at issue here contained many legitimate reasons for 
discounting Groves’ opinion.   
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requiring “no more than minimal contact with the public and co-workers.”  App. at 299.  
Hughes argues that the question should have incorporated his inability to interact with 
supervisors and coworkers in any fashion, as well as his inability to stay on task, use 
proper judgment, and control his emotions.  Hughes, however, did not credibly establish 
these limitations.  Therefore, we agree with the District Court that the ALJ incorporated 
into his hypothetical only those limitations that were clearly established.  Because the 
ALJ relied on a hypothetical to the vocational expert that included all of the limitations 
found credible in the RFC analysis, we see no error in the ALJ’s conclusion that work 
exists in the national economy that Hughes can perform.   
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment 
upholding the Commissioner’s determination of no disability. 
